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In November, 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International Monetary 
Fund, published a list of 29 “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs, now referred to as 
“globally systemically important banks” or G-SIBs), institutions whose failure, by virtue of “their 
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size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness”, could have dramatic negative consequences for 
the global financial system.  While “size” and “interconnectedness” have been the subject of much 
quantitative analysis, less attention has been paid to measuring “complexity.”  Yet without a 
consistent way to measure complexity, there is little guarantee that the designated SIFIs capture the 
complexity that the FSB is concerned about, and little hope of mitigating the consequences that the 
FSB warns of.  In this paper we propose the structure of an individual firm’s majority-control 
hierarchy as a proxy for institutional complexity. We demonstrate as a proof-of-concept how this 
method might be used by bank supervisors, particularly the Federal Reserve under its authority as 
consolidated supervisor, using a data set containing information on the majority-control hierarchies 
of many of the designated SIFIs.  Our mathematical intrafirm network representation (and various 
associated metrics we propose) provides a uniform way to compare firms with often very disparate 
organizational structures -- one that is distinct from a simple size comparison.      
 
Keywords:  SIFI, G-SIB, control hierarchy, macroprudential regulation, bank supervision, 
consolidated supervision 
JEL classification codes:   G28, G21, G01, C02 
 
*  
1. Introduction 
 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) describes a systemically important financial 
institution, or SIFI, as a financial institution “whose disorderly failure, because of their size, 
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider 
financial system and economic activity” (Financial Stability Board 2011).1  Developed in 
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis (hereafter the ‘post-crisis period’), this 
characterization represents an expanded regulatory definition relative to earlier ones based 
primarily on size (e.g., the list of “mandatory banks” subject to the Basel II capital 
regulations, see 72 FR 69298, December 7, 2007).   While size-based thresholds are 
appealing from a regulatory perspective in that they produce a dichotomous outcome, 
                                                        
1 The definition used by others, including the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS, 2014), includes 
two additional characteristics, namely the lack of readily available substitutes or financial institution 
infrastructure, and global (cross-jurisdictional) activity.  Since our focus in this paper is on complexity, we 
motivate our topic using the simpler FSB definition but highlight that we are aware of the other definitions as 
well.   We also note that the BCBS has advocated the use of an indicator for G-SIB designation that is an 
equally-weighted average of exposures in each of the five categories.   For the determinants of complexity, 
they list: (1) notional amount of OTC derivatives, (2) trading and AFS securities, (3) level 3 assets, each with a 
1/15 (6 2/3%) weight.  Scores are then distributed into buckets with a capital add-on associated with the 
different buckets. 
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thereby being transparent and easy to understand and implement, they are overly simplistic 
in the presumption that risk can be evaluated via a single value.2  
Although historically regulatory emphasis has been on the risk of a given organization, 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 highlighted the extensive 
interconnectedness of the financial system and the importance of considering not just the 
risk to a single firm but the risk to the entire financial system, i.e., the risk to financial 
stability.3  Much of the research on interconnectedness has been formulated mathematically 
in terms of networks. The importance of such research for policymakers was highlighted in 
a May 10, 2013 speech by then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke:  “Network analysis, yet 
another promising tool under active development, has the potential to help us better monitor 
the interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets” (Bernanke 2013). 
Yet despite a large literature addressing the interrelationships among economic and 
financial network participants (e.g., Elsinger et al., 2006, Cohen-Cole et al., 2010, Haldane 
and May 2011, Adamic et al., 2012, Battiston et al., 2012, Billio et al., 2012, Hautsch et al., 
2012, 2013, Kapadia et al., 2013, Squartini et al., 2013, Caccioli et al., 2014), there has been 
comparatively little development of metrics concerning the complexity of the individual 
firms that comprise the system – the other key attribute highlighted in the FSB’s definition.  
Alessandri et al. (2015) point to the Lehman collapse as an example of how widespread 
financial instability resulted from the failure of a complex organization and go on to argue 
                                                        
2 In their survey of metrics for quantifying systemic risk, Bisias et al. (2012) refer to reliance on a single 
number to assess risk as a “Maginot Line Strategy”.  They argue that risk is multifaceted and that therefore 
multiple metrics are required to capture risk. 
 
3 The link between SIFI designation of a single institution and global financial stability is well-summarized by 
Alessandri et al., 2015:  “Systemic importance relates to the damage that the failure of a financial institution 
may cause to global financial stability, whereas systemic risk relates to the probability of default of an 
institution.”  
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that a firm’s complexity is a much more critical determinant of systemic importance than its 
size.  Hampering the development of research related to a financial institution’s complexity, 
in addition to data limitations (National Academy of Sciences 2010), is that “we lack a clear 
consensus on how to assess an entity’s complexity” (Cetorelli, McAndrews, and Traina 
2014, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2014).  Failing any direct definition, one view of  an 
individual firm’s complexity comes from the lens of governance: “high complexity” would 
be interpreted as a corporate control structure rife with governance challenges for a firm’s 
management, resulting in a lack of oversight that in turn poses significant operational, 
reputational, and balance sheet risk (Adams 2010, Vitali et al., 2011).  This same 
complexity might present challenges to bank regulators, tasked with gathering information 
from a variety of sources to assess the systemic importance of the firm.  This is particularly 
the case for the Federal Reserve, as it has the unique role of being the consolidated 
supervisor.4  Organizational complexity contributes to the possibility that subsidiaries act in 
relative obscurity within the organization, thus hindering the regulators’ ability to carry out 
effective consolidated supervision.  In this context, complexity therefore poses risk to an 
accurate assessment of the organization’s systemic importance and hence to financial 
stability.5     
One way to describe the organizational structure of a firm is via its control hierarchy 
(Vitali et al., 2011), consisting of a (parent) company and all of its subsidiaries, considered 
in its natural hierarchical and networked arrangement. This is a standard representation of 
                                                        
4 In providing guidance as to how to effectively carry out this role, the Bank Holding Company Supervision 
Manual (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2017) notes that “The Federal Reserve’s conduct 
of consolidated supervision is central to and dependent on the coordination with, and reliance on, the work of 
other relevant primary supervisors and functional regulators” (page 374, §2060.05.6.8). 
5 The idea that imperfect or incomplete information reduces the ability to mitigate risk is discussed in Battiston 
and Martinez-Jaramillo (2018). 
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the intraconnectedness of a firm, along the lines of Coase (1937) who described a firm as a 
“system of relationships”.6  While interfirm financial network complexity is a well-studied 
subject (see e.g., Arinaminpathy et al. 2012, Caballero and Simsek 2013, Haubrich and Lo 
2013 and references therein, Roukny et al. 2013, Battiston et al. 2016a,b, Aldasoro and 
Alves 2018, Berndsen et al. 2018, Constantin et al. 2018, León et al. 2018, Roukny et al. 
2018), many of the network methods in that literature are not applicable to the very specific 
kinds of network topologies that characterize majority-control hierarchies, which are by 
construction rooted directed trees (in the parlance of computer science).  
Complex majority-control hierarchies present difficulties for regulators tasked with 
supervisory oversight (Blair and Kushmeider 2006, National Academy of Sciences 2010, 
Viñals et al. 2013), particularly the Federal Reserve in its role as consolidated supervisor.7  
Greater complexity (in terms of organizational structure and business activities) of an 
individual firm makes it harder for a consolidated supervisor to disentangle and understand 
the firm’s structure and increases the likelihood that some parts of the firm’s activities and 
interrelationships go unnoticed.  In the case of large multinational organizations, a 
complexity measure related to oversight would naturally account for the burdens posed by 
coordinating over multiple national and regulatory environments. Therefore, the 
identification of metrics that enable comparison across firms that may have very different 
                                                        
6 In this seminal paper, Coase (1937) uses this description to argue that a firm cannot increase in size 
indefinitely and notes that as a firm grows, the losses due to mistakes will increase.   In a different context (law 
firm mergers), Briscoe and Tsai (2011) note that following a merger, there is a delay in value creation and 
coordination due to the time it takes for relationships to develop, a situation that is likely to be the case in the 
context of financial firms as well.  A similar delay in identifying and mitigating systemic importance is likely 
to occur as a result of the need for supervisory coordination. 
7 Throughout this paper, we will use the terms “supervisor” and “regulator” interchangeably, to refer to an 
entity responsible for assessing some aspect of risk in an organization.  In the context of our discussion, these 
references relate to external (e.g., governmental) assessment but in principle our proposed metrics may also be 
useful for risk managers within a firm.   
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majority-control hierarchies is of critical importance to consolidated supervision in the post-
2008 financial crisis environment.8 
 The supervisory challenges we envision are likely what motivated the requirement 
that SIFIs indicate the number of “material” supervisors and regulators with whom they 
must interact in the resolution plans that they must file to comply with Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act.9  In our case, it is not just the number of different supervisors and regulators that 
is relevant but the way in which those supervisors and regulators have to interact with each 
other.  Thus our paper provides a natural extension to the existing understanding of the 
coordination challenges supervisors face, much as network analysis has advanced 
knowledge regarding interconnectedness by noting that it is not only the number of 
connections that is important but the way in which those connections arise. 
Our paper is most closely related to the work of Carmassi and Herring (2014) who 
note that institutional complexity “...impeded effective oversight by the authorities ex ante 
and greatly complicated crisis management and the resolution of institutions ex post.”  
Using Bankscope to obtain data on “majority-owned subsidiaries for which the G-SIB is the 
ultimate owner with a minimum control path of 50.01%” (i.e., a control definition that is 
similar to the one used in this paper), Carmassi and Herring (2014) define complexity as the 
number of subsidiaries but emphasize, “This is a very simplistic indicator of corporate 
complexity, but it remains the only indicator that can be measured with any degree of 
accuracy and even that is far from perfect.”  We agree with both their premise and 
                                                        
8 This point is echoed by Viñals et al. (2013), “Recent evidence from the crisis does not implicate specific 
bank business models as susceptible to greater risk of failure.  Nevertheless, structural measures could be a 
useful complement to traditional prudential tools under certain conditions.  Targeting them to reflect firm-
specific risk profiles increases their effectiveness relative to the one-size-fits-all approach envisaged by the 
recent structural reform proposals, albeit the targeted approach requires firm political commitment and support 
for supervisors.” 
9 Carmassi and Herring (2014) also note in Chapter 4 that the FSB identified the need to cooperate as one of 
five remaining challenges that regulators faced in order for resolution to proceed in an orderly manner.   
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characterization of the existing metrics for assessing complexity and indeed, it is the dearth 
of metrics that motivates our investigation.   
This paper proposes network-based metrics to encode organizational complexity. 
Ours is a novel approach that uses the innate network structure of a majority-control 
hierarchy. As we explain below, we see this representation, as well as the metrics we 
construct, as intimately related to the kinds of oversight/regulatory challenges that the 
Federal Reserve as consolidated supervisor might face. As such we hope that our metrics 
based on intra-firm complexity will be a useful addition to the more-commonly-studied 
inter-firm complexity (i.e., the interconnectedness across firms) metrics.    
The metrics we propose also are intended to inform the Federal Reserve’s judgment 
regarding the SIFI designation.  The network encoding and associated metrics also admit the 
use of simulations as a means of assessing changes in complexity should a firm alter its 
business structure via a change in majority-control hierarchy.  Such simulations could prove 
helpful for understanding the supervisory implications of altering a firm’s majority-control 
hierarchy in the process of winding down a firm (such as in the case of the dismantling of 
Lehman Brothers), or in arranging a rapid acquisition, (e.g., in the cases of the JP Morgan 
Chase acquisitions of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, the Bank of America 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch, or the Wells Fargo acquisition of Wachovia). The goal would 
be to ensure continuity of consolidated supervision in the wake of a crisis, thereby fostering 
financial stability, a key component of the Federal Reserve’s mandate.   
Among the questions we address using network-based metrics are: 
 Do the SIFI institutions in our sample appear to be more complex? 
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 Do size rankings match complexity rankings that utilize country and SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification) code information? 
 How has the complexity of the firms in our sample changed over time? 
The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 describes a small dataset that we will use to 
illustrate the type of insights that can be drawn using our proposed metrics.   Section 3 
introduces the metrics we employ.   Section 4 provides a proof-of-concept by reporting 
results of our methods on the sample dataset.  Section 5 contains additional discussion and 
Section 6 concludes.   
2. Data  
To illustrate how our proposed methods might be used in practice, we use an 
anonymized data set provided to us by Kingland Systems10 of twenty-nine large financial 
institutions that include 19 of the original 29 SIFIs and 10 other firms (5 non-SIFI banks and 
5 insurance companies).  See Appendix A for a complete list of the firms;  Table A1 
contains some basic descriptive statistics for the anonymized sample.  In all subsequent 
analysis, the data are numbered in random order within group (i.e., SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, 
and insurance companies) to protect confidentiality.  Additionally, because Kingland is not 
the only company that collects such data, our SIFI sample is restricted to those firms for 
which Kingland collects data; hence not all SIFIs are available for our analysis.  The other 
10 firms in our analysis (i.e., the 5 non-SIFI banks and 5 insurance companies) were chosen 
at random by Kingland based on some rudimentary guidelines (i.e., that the non-SIFI banks 
be from comparable SIC codes, that there be an equivalent number from the insurance sector 
                                                        
10 Kingland Systems is one of the leading companies that collects entity data, and specifically legal entity 
identification (see http://www.kingland.com/ for more information).   We are grateful to Kingland, and 
especially to Tony Brownlee, George Suskalo, and Kyle Wiebers for their generosity in providing the data and 
their patience in answering our various questions.   
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for comparison and that the two sets be roughly comparable to each other in asset size) and 
provided to us for analysis.  We emphasize that these data are intended to be illustrative of 
the potential use of our measures and that conclusive evidence will be left for future 
research on a more representative/complete sample. 
For each firm, we obtain underlying data that encodes the control hierarchy. In this 
context “control” is defined by Kingland Systems as the parent controlling at least 50%+1 of 
the voting share for the child subsidiary.11  As described above, this is the intra-institutional 
system of all parent-child majority-control relationships that stem from the “ultimate parent” 
(the firm of interest) through the ongoing process of creation, acquisition, and dissolution of 
subsidiaries by various entities in the institution. We do not know the names of the 
subsidiaries in the control hierarchies, only the parent-child linkages (as given by 
anonymized Kingland ID).  In addition to the control relationships the dataset also contains 
the country of origin and four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code of each 
subsidiary;  we refer to these characteristics as ‘labels’ below.12  We have data for the 
twenty-nine institutions at two distinct dates, May 26, 2011 and February 25, 2013, 
spanning either side of the change (due to the Dodd-Frank Act) in the reporting threshold 
for consolidated entities. 
 
3. Methods 
                                                        
11 We note that in actuality there are numerous definitions of control (e.g., it may depend upon the nature of 
ownership in terms of the kinds of interest – voting or non-voting), see Carmassi and Herring (2014) for a 
detailed discussion of alternative sources of control hierarchy data and the limitations inherent in each. While 
our data has the advantage of being comprehensive in that it is also used by the firms for business and 
regulatory purposes, its proprietary nature is an obvious limitation. As the goal of our paper is to highlight the 
way in which metrics can be constructed from network methods to inform supervisory assessments, in 
particular the assessments of the Federal Reserve tasked with a responsibility as consolidated supervisor, we 
do not explore alternative definitions.  
12 https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html 
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We draw on techniques from the science of networks to analyze the organizational 
structure of these large market participants (see Newman 2010 for a basic reference). 
Network analysis has already proven important for its ability to articulate complex 
interrelationships in financial networks, in particular, Roukney et al. (2018) highlight the 
importance of the network structure itself (i.e., the topology of the network) in the context of 
interconnected networks.  Our research is related to their idea but we instead consider 
intrafirm networks;  to date there has been little research on this aspect of financial 
stability.13  Subsequent to the writing of this paper, Flood et al., 2017 similarly emphasize 
the importance of the topology of intrafirm networks for financial stability, particularly in 
times of crisis when rapid decision-making is critical  (e.g., in assessing ease of resolution of 
a failing firm).  The relevance of intrafirm networks for financial stability also stems from 
the microprudential approach to the determination of systemic importance. 
 
3.1. Definitions and Assumptions 
Before stating our assumptions, we first need to define some standard network terms.  
The networks describing the majority-control structures of the firms in our study are 
characterized by a rooted directed tree structure (see Figure 1).  A tree is a network without 
loops.  This type of network is composed of nodes and edges. It is directed if the edges (i.e., 
the links between the nodes) come with a direction. Note (as indicated in Figure 1) a rooted 
tree has a special node, the “root”, also called the ultimate parent.  In the trees of interest 
                                                        
13  In the Journal of Financial Stability special issue on Network Models, Stress Testing and Other Tools for 
Financial Stability Monitoring and Macroprudential Policy Design and Implementation, (April 2018), for 
example, none of the papers considered intrafirm network structure, suggesting that despite growing literature 
on the complexity of interconnected financial networks, there is still much work to be done in the area of 
intrafirm complexity.   
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(representing majority-control hierarchies) all edges point away from the root. An edge 
pointing from node A (the “parent”) to node B (a “child”) encodes the fact that entity A has 
majority control over entity B (i.e., entity B is a subsidiary of entity A).  Nodes that have no 
directed edges to other nodes (i.e. they do not have majority-control over any entities) are 
called leaves. The maximum number of nodes that a path from the root to any leaf would 
pass through is referred to as the depth of the tree. The number of children for a given node 
is called the degree of that node.14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic network terminology and structures for rooted directed trees. This figure shows a particular 
example of a rooted directed tree. The root is node A, while B, D, and E are leaves or leaf nodes. Node C is 
neither the root nor a leaf and is sometimes called an internal node. Nodes B and C are children of the node A, 
which is the parent of these nodes. In addition, this is a regularly branching tree in which each node that has 
children has exactly two children. This tree has depth 2 (the distance of from the root node A to the farthest 
children down the tree, in this case either node D or node E) and a total of five nodes. If this were the tree 
corresponding to a control structure of a financial institution, then the “ultimate parent” would be node A and 
nodes B and C would be direct subsidiaries of A in which A still held a controlling interest, while D and E 
would denote subsidiaries of C in which C held a controlling interest.  
 
We refer to the layout of nodes and edges corresponding to the majority control-hierarchy as 
the topology of the network.  We make the following assumptions about this topology: 
A1. Information:  Information flows more easily between nodes with the same label (i.e., 
the same country or industry).  Therefore the number (proportion) of child nodes whose 
                                                        
14 In more general directed networks this is often referred to as the “out-degree” of the node, to distinguish 
from the “in-degree”, that is, the number of immediate parents of a given node.  However, in a rooted tree, all 
nodes except for the root have in-degree one, so throughout this paper we will use “degree” to refer to out-
degree. 
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labels differ from their immediate parent is a proxy for the amount of coordination 
required to exchange information between those nodes and their immediate parent.  The 
lower the proportion, the greater the ease of accessing needed information. 
A2. Firm-level decision-making:  Coordination is critical to both short-term and long-term 
decision-making regarding a firm.  It follows from A1 that coordination is easier within 
the same geographic jurisdiction or industry.  In addition, due to consolidated reporting 
requirements imposed by, among others, the Federal Reserve, supervisory oversight of a 
multinational firm occurs globally but similarly relies on cross-jurisdictional and cross-
industry coordination. 
A3. Supervisory evaluation:  Coordination is also critical to the supervisory process, 
particularly for the Federal Reserve as articulated in the Bank Holding Company 
Supervisory Manual (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2017).    
 
In the context of a (banking) supervisor, we additionally assume: 
a. Risks outside of one’s supervisory domain can only be observed indirectly (i.e., through 
communication and coordination with other regulators).  Thus, the risk to financial 
stability posed by a systemically important firm is related to the ability of its (country or 
industry) supervisors to coordinate with each other to monitor the firm.   
b. A supervisor has access to all information within its own country/industry.15   In 
addition, supervisors exert sufficient oversight and control within their domain.   In 
other words, supervisory lapses occur unintentionally as a result of lack of coordination / 
                                                        
15 In some countries, for example the US, there are multiple regulators, so that even within-country 
coordination may be challenging.  For the purposes of our discussion, we ignore this additional layer of 
complexity at the country level; it is reflected in the discussions of SIC complexity. 
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communication / information and not due to incompetence or negligence or for any 
other intentional or malicious reasons.   
c. A consolidated supervisor (e.g., the Federal Reserve, see Appendix B) is additionally 
responsible for aggregating information across a number of supervisors of different 
domains.   The consolidated supervisor’s ability to do this effectively depends on its 
ability to obtain this information which in turn is affected by the organizational structure 
of the firm for which it is responsible, due to the amount of coordination required.  A 
more complex organizational structure renders the task more challenging because it 
hinders both: (a) communication, including the communication of risk, and (b) the 
coordination that is necessary for risk mitigation and management, as well as for 
resolution efforts (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2014, Alessandri et al. 2015, Flood et al. 
2017), at both the firm and supervisory level.   
 
The above three assumptions follow from the Bank Holding Company Supervision 
Manual’s (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2017) emphasis on the 
importance of Federal Reserve coordination with, and reliance on information from, other 
primary and functional regulators for the purposes of carrying out its role as consolidated 
supervisor (see Appendix B for relevant passages).    
An implication of Assumptions A1-A3 is that it is not just the number of children 
emanating from a node that is important for consolidated supervision.  Rather (Assumption 
A1) it is the ease by which a consolidated supervisor can access the information necessary 
in order to make his or her assessment.  A subsidiary with children that all fall under the 
same supervisor or functional regulator is easier to assess than one with children that each 
J
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
oo
f
14 
 
fall under different country or SIC classifications because no coordination with other 
supervisors is required in the first case while the second requires coordination across a 
number of different supervisors.16  The assumptions also imply that less breadth of expertise 
is required to supervise a subgroup that is totally within one’s domain.   
The next three assumptions link financial stability to the coordination challenges 
associated with a firm’s organizational structure: 
A4. Risk Implications.  In the absence of coordination, opacity ensues, threatening 
financial stability by increasing the probability that a risk will either occur or go 
undetected for longer.   
A5. Transmission of risk within the firm:  Spillover of risk (i.e., from one country to 
another or one industry to another) within a firm is more likely to occur across 
heterogeneous linkages (i.e., edges that connect nodes with different labels) than across 
homogeneous linkages (i.e., edges that connect nodes with the same label) due to the 
above-mentioned coordination/information assumptions. 
A6. Transmission of risk outside the firm:  Because complexity is important for the 
assessment of the risk of an individual organization, it in turn is important for mitigating 
systemic risk and thus, financial stability.   This assumption follows from the Carmassi 
and Herring (2014) premise in the Introduction.17 
 
                                                        
16 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014, footnote 11) make a similar point in the context of the challenges a firm’s 
management faces when a parent and its affiliate are located in different countries.  They also mention the 
monitoring difficulty that organizational complexity might pose in their footnote 14. 
17 This assumption is not really necessary for our analysis but is important to the idea that our metrics may be 
useful for SIFI designation.   We acknowledge that there is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding 
whether the failure of a single firm necessarily implies a systemic cascade and emphasize that we are agnostic 
on this point but mention the Carmassi and Herring (2014) assumption to motivate our focus on a subset of 
SIFI firms and to highlight the fact that we are not alone in drawing the link to financial stability. 
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Regulatory considerations create constraints on the arrangement of the nodes and edges 
in the rooted trees derived from the control hierarchy. For example, the Banking Act of 
1933 (more commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, after its Senator and Congressman 
sponsors) required a separation between commercial and investment banks (as well as other 
restrictions). In a network theoretic framework, this would mean that under Glass-Steagall, 
commercial and investment banks would need to be in different subtrees in the control 
hierarchy (e.g., in Figure 1, investment banks would need to be on one side of the root and 
commercial banks on the other).  Similarly, legal and tax incentives might drive patterns of 
country-incorporation, resulting in a tree structure where nodes associated with a specific 
business classification are also associated with a specific country. The 1999 passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed many of the Glass-Steagall restrictions, fostering 
substantial growth-by-acquisition in the banking sector as banks diversified into new 
industries and countries (DeYoung et al. 2009).  In tree terminology, the repeal would 
suggest that banking trees are less characterized by country- or SIC-specific subtrees but 
instead have become more jumbled.  As the recent financial crisis unfolded, many viewed 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall as partially responsible, and calls to reenact it intensified, 
resulting in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.  As a result, we might expect to see banking trees 
moving back toward their pre-1999 subtree separation (moving closer to a “perfect tree” in 
the terminology of the next section).  In addition, the 2012 lowering of the threshold 
requiring subsidiaries to report on a consolidated basis (as stipulated in the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Act) suggests we should see an increase in the number of nodes included in the 
majority-control hierarchies between 2011 and 2013.  Therefore, the patterns of SIC and 
Jo
urn
l P
re-
pro
of
16 
 
country codes (as node labels) in the majority-control hierarchy could help to reify these 
regulatory changes and should be of interest to banking supervisors. 
 
3.2. Statistical Description of Tree Heterogeneity 
This section of the paper delineates some metrics to quantify several important 
characteristics of the institutions’ majority-control hierarchy trees that relate to the ease of 
coordination that are highlighted in Assumptions A1-A6.  Despite a high degree of 
heterogeneity in the firms’ structures, these metrics provide a basis for comparison.   
A fundamental quantitative descriptor for any network (tree or not) is its degree 
distribution, describing the probability distribution associated with the network’s set of 
degrees (i.e., the function d(i) that records the fraction of nodes with i children).  Just as the 
degree distribution of a tree describing a firm’s reporting lines might be used to characterize 
the spans of control (Urwick 1956) of its management, the degree distribution of a firm’s 
majority-control hierarchy analogously might be used to describe a consolidated 
supervisor’s span of control in assessing the firm’s systemic importance.  
For this reason, we therefore introduce a new metric of complexity that we see as 
related to supervisory challenges derived from the need to coordinate oversight efforts 
across a variety of jurisdictions and agencies.  It follows from the assumptions that the 
simplest supervisory structure a firm can have is a “perfect” supervisory tree, where all 
nodes of a certain label are clustered (in the language of Flood et al. 2017, this equates to the 
number of maximally homogeneous subgroups – subtrees that consist of nodes of a single 
label – being equal to the number of labels).   
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Assumption A3 forms the baseline for our analysis.  In assessing the complexity of 
any given firm, we derive a measure reflecting the distance of the majority-control hierarchy 
tree from this “ideal” supervisory or perfect tree structure.18   
 
 We illustrate how this can be done using our Kingland data sample.  For each firm, 
we consider a “perfect” supervisory baseline to be one with topology equal to the firm in 
question, where beginning with the nodes at level 2 each child (subsidiary) has the same 
label (either country or 2-digit SIC classification) as its immediate parent, -- i.e., we take as 
given the firm’s heterogeneity at level 1, reflecting its decisions regarding the distribution of 
business or geographic lines to each of the immediate subsidiaries (children) of the ultimate 
parent.  By imposing that all edges beyond level 1 join nodes with similar labels, this 
process will produce a tree with (country or SIC) distributions that may be quite different 
from the firm’s actual majority-control hierarchy. In our framework, a perfect tree is 
comprised of perfect groupings, that is, country-specific (or SIC-specific) groupings that do 
not involve other countries (SIC codes).  Of course in reality none of the firms we consider 
will have an exact perfect tree structure (i.e., one where there are no edges connecting two 
nodes with different labels).  To this end we introduce the notion of perfect tree similarity. 
For each firm, we compare the proximity of their actual control hierarchy to their 
perfect supervisory baseline via a perfect tree statistic, in each case computing the fraction 
of nodes with the same label (i.e., country or 2-digit SIC code) as their immediate parent.  
The statistic is therefore bounded between zero and one.  Mathematically, let E denote the 
                                                        
18 That is, we begin by defining a “perfect tree” as one in which all nodes belong to the same (country or 2-
digit SIC) classification.  In other contexts, the phrase “perfect tree” refers to a tree with the same number of 
directed edges emanating from each node.   It is important to recognize that our definition differs from that 
one. 
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number of firms in our sample and Ni the total number of subsidiaries in firm i, i.e., the 
count of all nodes that are in firm i's majority-control structure).  We index all nodes in the 
firm with {0, 1,…,Ni}, where we always assign the root node index 0.  Also let si,j ϵ {1,…,S} 
be the label (i.e., the country or 2-digit SIC code) associated with subsidiary j of firm i, and 
pa(j) the parent node of that subsidiary j.  Finally let δ(٠) = 1 if the expression within the 
parentheses is true and zero otherwise.   Then the perfect tree statistic for firm i is given by: 
                                                               𝑆𝑖 =  
1
𝑁𝑖
∑ 𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑠𝑖,𝑝𝑎(𝑗))
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
                                    (1) 
As noted above, this is just the fraction of non-root nodes in firm i whose parents have the 
same label as the node itself. 
Note that in a perfect tree (i.e., a tree in which the perfect tree statistic is equal to 
one), removal of a node and all subtrees below it will not change the value of the statistic.19  
In contrast, a value of zero means that the subsidiaries below depth 1 are always different in 
character from their immediate parent (with respect to a given characteristic – country or 
SIC code) and therefore would require coordination among supervisors across all countries 
(industries) in which the firm operates.  Thus, to the extent that a firm’s tree structure is 
closer to a perfect supervisory tree, we reason that it is easier for both the firm and the 
supervisor to track/monitor the activities of its subsidiaries or to achieve resolution should 
the firm fail.  In practice we recognize that the perfect tree characterization is too rigid and 
the costs of a fully-segmented structure may far outweigh the benefits of globalization and 
cross-border banking, but we believe it may inform consolidated supervision by providing a 
regulatory ideal against which real world instances can be compared.  We refer to the 
                                                        
19 The supervisory analogue to this network structure might arise when a troubled firm is forced to sell or 
close one of its subsidiaries.   The closer the organizational structure is to a perfect tree, the less likely there 
will be disruption to the rest of the firm when the subsidiary is pared.   
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comparison between the perfect supervisory baseline and the firm’s actual majority-control 
hierarchy via their associated perfect tree statistics as the perfect tree similarity statistic. 
  The closer a firm is to its own perfect supervisory tree, the easier it will be for the 
consolidated supervisor to satisfy the mandate of the Bank Holding Company Act (to 
aggregate information from supervisors in different jurisdictions or industries evaluating the 
portion of the firm for which they are responsible) in order to form an assessment of the 
consolidated organization and without need for additional supervisory review.  Firms can be 
evaluated according to their own internal structure and the level of complexity they exhibit 
as a result of that structure can be compared, thus informing the allocation of supervisory 
resources. 
 
3.3. Comparing complexity across heterogeneous firms 
Assumptions A1-A6 lead us to the following: 
“By comparing the firm’s actual organizational structure to a hypothetical perfect tree 
structure, we can draw inferences about the challenges a firm and/or its supervisors would 
experience were one of its subsidiaries to experience deterioration.” 
It additionally follows from assumption A5 that the greater number of perfect 
groupings in a tree, the less likely that difficulty faced by a subsidiary in one country 
(industry) will spill over into subsidiaries in other countries (and the easier it will be to 
‘ring-fence’ the risk in a resolution situation).20  
                                                        
20 A resolution framework where each national authority has responsibility for the resolution of banks that fall 
under its jurisdiction is referred to as the “subsidiarization” model in of Carmassi and Herring (2014); in their 
context, our country and industry perfect tree statistics could inform the geographic subsidiarization and 
subsidiarization across lines of business that they propose. 
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The closer a structure is to a perfect tree, the easier it is for a supervisor to evaluate its 
risk.  This is because the supervisor has direct access to information from a higher 
proportion of subsidiaries in the firm.  Similarly, the farther away from a perfect tree, the 
more coordination is required for information to transmit to the consolidated supervisor.  
We expect firms to have moved closer to a perfect tree structure between 2011 and 2013. 
As noted above, Assumptions A1-A6 imply that organizational structures that are 
closer to a “perfect tree” will be easier for a supervisor to evaluate.  However, simply 
calculating the proportion of edges in the perfect tree that connects nodes of differing labels 
will not provide a satisfactory metric because different firms have different business models 
(and hence the distribution of their country and SIC classifications will differ) and thus 
some firms more than others will have structures and distributions that lend themselves 
naturally to be closer to a perfect tree.  Such a comparison would give rise to the “apples-to-
oranges” and aforementioned one-size-fits-all criticisms that banks often level at 
regulations, a reference to the idea that by their nature, regulations need to be general and 
hence don’t adequately account for the fact  that firms have different business models.   
Recognizing these criticisms, we therefore need to find a way to determine how unusual a 
specific firm’s organizational structure is, by comparing it to all the other structures that 
might arise, given the specific distribution of that firm’s characteristics.  Specifically, we 
take a firm's tree topology as fixed and bootstrap different labelings of the nodes (country or 
2-digit SIC code) according to the firm-specific empirical label transition probabilities.  
Concretely, for firm i, we first set the label of the root node, si,0, to its observed (actual) 
value.   We then traverse the tree following the edges through each node, sampling the label 
of each node according to the empirical conditional distribution: 
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             𝑝(𝑠𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑠 |𝑠𝑖,𝑝𝑎(𝑗) = 𝑡)  ∝  ∑ 𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑠)𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑝𝑎(𝑗) = 𝑡).
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
                      (2) 
We continue this process recursively for the child nodes of the root node and their children 
until we reach the leaf nodes.  When j is a non-leaf node (i.e., a node with children), we 
restrict s to be from the subset of labels associated with the non-leaf nodes in the observed 
tree; similarly, when j is a leaf node (i.e., a node with no children), we restrict s to be from 
the subset of labels associated with the leaf nodes in the observed tree.21  When drawing 
labels for the leaf nodes we add a small correction factor to the empirical probability, 1/|N|, 
where |N| is the number of nodes in the tree, to account for the fact that conditional on the 
simulated parent, drawing from the leaf-only empirical distribution might result in labels 
that have a 0% conditional probability.  This correction factor admits the possibility that 
another label (i.e., different from the observed one) might be assigned to the leaf; hence a 
greater variety of tree labelings can be explored. 
The number of bootstrap replications that we use for each firm varies in order to achieve 
sufficiently large coverage of the range of possible label combinations.  Specifically, for 
each firm we choose the number of bootstrap replicates according to the following formula:  
# replicates = (# of unique label-label transitions) x (maximum depth of the firm-specific 
tree) x (average # of children of the non-leaf nodes in the firm-specific tree), where the 
average # of children is the mean number of children emanating from all non-leaf nodes.22  
For each replication, the perfect tree similarity statistic is computed.    
                                                        
21 This is because in our trees there are many labels that do not appear as leaves and/or never emanate from 
certain parent labels and others that only appear as leaves and always emanate from the same parent label. 
22 Leaf nodes by definition have zero children, hence including them in the computation of the average would 
result in a strictly (and sometimes much) lower average.  Since we are primarily interested in a larger (rather 
than smaller) number of replications, we exclude these from the computation of the average.  We acknowledge 
that this formula is somewhat arbitrary.  In an earlier version of the paper, the number of replications was fixed 
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The replications therefore allow us to generate a distribution of possible structures for 
each firm, conditional on its overall topology (organizational structure), and to compute a 
range of summary statistics from these distributions.  Our approach allows a supervisor to 
compare complexity across firms that have different country and industry profiles, while 
still holding the tree topology and distribution of countries/industries fixed for each firm.   
In particular, from the replications we can compute a percentile ranking for each firm, 
representing the proportion of simulations that produced a perfect tree similarity statistic 
that was lower (higher) than the one given by the firm’s observed structure. 
 
3.4. Two Examples 
As explained in Section 2, the majority-control hierarchy imposes a tree structure on the 
data, driven by consolidated supervision considerations. That is, for the purposes of 
consolidation, as we navigate through a chain of subsidiaries, we should never loop back to 
any of the intermediate (or parent) entities.  For illustrative purposes, it is useful to select a 
firm with a small number of nodes to demonstrate the information in the tree layouts further. 
23  Figure 2 considers SIFI S11; in 2011, this firm had 43 nodes, corresponding to 14 
countries, four 1-digit SIC codes, and seven 2-digit SIC codes, with a tree depth of four.  In 
figures such as this, the largest circle represents the ultimate parent, with the size of other 
circles decreasing with growing distance from this parent: the smaller the circle, the farther 
down the tree it is.  Figure 2a shows the layout of S11 by depth.  Note that S11 has most of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
at 1,000.  Using a formula to determine the number of replicates recognizes the fact that the number of 
possible tree combinations for a firm with a small number of nodes (e.g., S11) is much lower than the number 
for a firm with a large number of nodes (e.g., S19). This formula was chosen to strike a balance between 
having a large number of replicates for even the smallest firms and the computational burden that would result 
from simulating a proportionate number of replicates for the largest firms.     
23 All layouts were done using the freely available Gephi software package, available at https://gephi.org/  The 
layouts are normalized to be consistent across figures – that is, we have created layouts in which nodes are in 
the same positions from figure to figure.  
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its subsidiaries at depth 3, with 28 entities distributed among four depth 2 subsidiaries.  In 
addition, all but one of the children of the root (ultimate parent) is a leaf (does not control 
any additional subsidiaries). Thus, most of the control hierarchy in this  
tree emanates from one child of the ultimate parent; in the absence of that one node, the tree 
would have depth 1.   It should be evident, therefore, that severing the link between 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a:  by depth (n=4) Figure 2b:  by country (n=14) 
Figure 2c:  by 1-digit 
SIC classification (n=4) 
Figures 2a-d.  The control hierarchy of SIFI S11, color-coded by distance from the ultimate 
Figure 2d:  by 2-digit 
SIC classification (n=7) 
CA = Canada 
CH = Switzerland 
CN = China 
GB = Great Britain 
GR = Greece 
HK = Hong Kong 
ID = India 
JP = Japan 
LU = Luxembourg 
NL = Netherlands 
RU = Russia 
SG = Singapore 
TW = Taiwan 
US = United States 
3 =Heavy Manufactured Products 
6 = Financial and insurance 
7 and 8 = Services 
 
37 = Transportation Equipment 
60 = Depository Institutions 
61 = Nondepository Credit Inst. 
62 = Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges 
67 = Holding and Other Inv. Offices 
73 = Business Services 
87 = Engineering, Accounting, 
Research, Management Services 
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the root and that particular node would dramatically change the tree configuration, 
whereas severing the link with any other nodes at depth one would hardly change the 
configuration at all.  Put another way, that node is an essential component of the 
complexity of the firm’s majority-control hierarchy.  Hence it may be a node of particular 
focus for a supervisor charged with evaluating the complexity of the SIFI. 
Figure 2b considers S11’s control hierarchy when labeled by country.  Despite the 
parent company being incorporated in Japan, most (five of eight) of its immediate 
children are incorporated in Great Britain, with only two incorporated in Japan and one in 
Greece.  Yet among the 35 other children in the tree, all except the two US subsidiaries at 
depth 4 have an immediate parent that is also incorporated in Japan, suggesting that it 
will be relatively easy for a Japanese supervisor to obtain information at all levels of 
control of the firm since there are only two entities beyond the immediate reach of the 
supervisor.24   
Figure 2c illustrates S11’s control hierarchy labeled by 1-digit SIC code.  At the 
1-digit level, this firm is fairly homogeneous, with 31 of the children of the ultimate 
parent operating in the same industry.  In addition to financial services, this firm has 
control over one subsidiary in SIC area 3 (roughly construction and equipment), and 11 
in services (areas 7 and 8); for the most part the services are concentrated in one subtree 
(to the left of the diagram).  With most of the tree falling into the same SIC classification, 
it is evident that a financial services supervisor would be able to assess most of the firm’s 
activities without having to rely on coordination with supervisors from other industries.  
                                                        
24 The tree structure with most subsidiaries being controlled by a Japanese subsidiary may reflect a keiretsu 
arrangement (Berglof and Perotti, 1994).  We thank a referee for bringing this to our attention.  Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2014) similarly note that using their metrics and definition of complexity, Japanese banking 
organizations appear to be less complex.    
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In addition, since the subsidiaries that fall under SIC classification 7 are concentrated in 
one subtree, the diagram highlights a single link that might warrant additional scrutiny or 
that might be severed should either the firm or its supervisor wish to reduce the range of 
the firm’s business activities. An additional implication is that should this link (between 
the subtree under SIC classification 7 and its parent node with SIC classification 6) be 
severed, either due to deacquisition or the subtree falling below the majority-control 
threshold, there would be little change to the burden of the consolidated supervisor.  
Figure 2d analogously illustrates S11’s control hierarchy labeled by 2-digit SIC code. 
For comparison, consider Figure 3 in which we see the same kinds of snapshots 
(at the same date) for a much larger firm (S16): this firm has 1778 nodes, corresponding 
to 32 countries and 100 4-digit SIC codes, with a tree depth of 5. We provide three 
representations color-coded according to distance from the root, country of origin, and 1-
digit SIC code, respectively.    Figure 3a shows that the majority of nodes are at depth 2.  
Specifically, there are 299 nodes at depth 1, 1186 nodes at depth 2, 188 nodes at depth 3, 
24 nodes at depth 4 and 80 nodes at depth 5.  Figure 3b illustrates that in addition to the 
parent company being located in the US (the largest circle in the center), the majority of 
S16’s subsidiaries are also located in the US.  In addition, some of those US subsidiaries  
themselves have quite elaborate majority-control hierarchies, judging from the large 
clusters at the top of the figure, as well as the ones on the far left, far right and bottom of 
the figure, that are almost exclusively comprised of US subsidiaries.  There are also a 
large number of subsidiaries located in the UK (green), Germany (yellow), and Spain 
(light blue), with the UK and Spanish subsidiaries having a number of children that are 
located in the same country as their immediate parent.  Figure 3c shows that while many  
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  Figure 3a:  by depth (n=5) Figure 3b:  by country (n=32) 
Figure 3c:  by 1-digit SIC classification (n=9) 
Figures 3a-c.  The control hierarchy of SIFI S16, color-coded by distance from the ultimate 
parent, by depth, country, and 1-digit SIC classification.  A consistent layout is used for all 
three representations, for comparability.  Node size is proportional to distance to the ultimate 
parent, with larger nodes corresponding to closer distance. 
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of S16’s subsidiaries are in the same 1-digit SIC classification as the parent company 
(classification 6 – Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), the company also has a fairly 
diversified range of subsidiaries with the second largest 1-digit classification in the 
wholesale and retail trade sectors (SIC code 5). 
Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that this view of complexity is 
multidimensional, that is, a firm that has a complex SIC classification structure may not 
have a complex country structure and vice versa.25  Identification of these complexity 
dimensions provides a way to evaluate and compare sometimes very disparate firms and 
may inform allocation of supervisory resources.   In addition, network information can be 
used to develop metrics with which to compare complexity across firms. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we present several results describing the tree topology of the firms in 
our sample; discussion of the implications of these results for our three main questions of 
interest is reserved for the next section.  The main results are given in the following 
subsections, corresponding to different metrics: 
1) Degree statistics 
2) Markov statistics (parent-child transitions) 
3) Perfect tree similarity statistics 
We then use these metrics to illustrate the manner in which supervisors might draw 
inferences about the firms and explore whether there are differences between the 
coordination efforts required for different types of institutions.  Finally, we consider 
                                                        
25 The observation that the risks firms face may be multidimensional forms the basis for much of the work 
on multilayer networks.  See, for example, Battiston et al. (2016a,b) and Berndsen et al. (2018) 
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whether our metrics provide additional information beyond the size delineation that has 
traditionally been used to classify institutions that warrant greater regulatory oversight 
due to their systemic importance.  Note that while in this paper we focus our discussion 
exclusively on the overall tree topology of the firms in our sample, a similar analysis can 
be readily conducted on any subtrees of interest, for example to inform ring-fencing 
decisions that supervisors might need to make once a risk has been identified. 
 
4.1. Overall degree statistics.   
One way to characterize the organizational structure of the firms is via the hierarchy 
distribution, that is, the proportion of nodes at each level of the tree hierarchy. To aid our 
understanding of how tree hierarchies might be used in the context of large financial 
institutions, it is useful to first consider how different organizational structures 
correspond to different hierarchy distributions.  For example, an institution with a very 
flat (i.e., “entrepreneurial”) management structure would have a large proportion of nodes 
at level one and relatively few branches extending from those nodes.  In contrast, an 
institution that concentrates its decision-making among only a few senior managers who 
are then held accountable for large portions of the firm would have a larger proportion of 
nodes at lower levels of the tree.  Such a diffuse tree might also be found among  
organizations that have experienced significant growth by acquisition, such as many 
financial institutions in the decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis, where the tree of 
an acquired complex organization may have been grafted to the tree of the acquiring 
parent somewhere below the highest level, creating a very hierarchical structure of great 
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depth (a “bureaucratic” structure).  Firms also might be arranged along geographical 
(“divisional”) or industry (“functional”) lines (Armour and Teece 1978).26   
The hierarchy distribution for our sample of firms is summarized in Figure 4, for 
2011 and 2013 separately. Note that there is substantial variation across the firms.  For 
example, while in 2011 more than one-third of the firms have more than half of their 
nodes at the first level of the tree hierarchy, others have relatively few nodes branching 
from the ultimate parent and instead have a large concentration of nodes farther down the 
tree (e.g., S13 and B1).  None of the firms with the deepest trees (i.e., more than six 
levels) have node concentration at the first level of the tree hierarchy, indicating a flatter 
or more diffuse organizational structure.  Note firm I4 has a tree structure that spreads out 
at each level in 2011.  Across all firms in our sample, roughly one-third of the nodes are 
in each of the first two levels, another 22% in the third level, and only 10% at deeper 
levels in the tree hierarchy. 
In contrast, by 2013, the tree hierarchies of the firms in our sample deepened 
substantially.   For example, only half as many (five) firms now have more than half their 
nodes at the first level, while 14 have less than 10% of their nodes at the first level.   In 
addition, 11 firms now have more than seven levels while just two years earlier, none did.  
Across all firms in the sample, by 2013 roughly 25% of the nodes were at deeper than the 
third level.  Thus, from the perspective of consolidated supervision, the challenges 
associated with assessing these firms increased dramatically, with many entities in the 
organization being much farther removed from the ultimate (root) parent.   
                                                        
26 An earlier version of our paper (Lumsdaine, et al., 2016) discussed the similarity of the firms’ degree 
distributions to power law distributions (distributions that have the form x-r for some r>1.  Power law 
distributions suggest certain patterns of growth in the network and also have implications for its robustness 
and stability. 
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Figure 4.  For each firm, we plot the fraction of nodes at each level in its control hierarchy (i.e., the 
distance from the root), for 2011 and 2013.  For ease of comparability between 2011 and 2013, for firms 
with more than nine levels in 2013, the fraction of nodes beyond level 9 are aggregated into the “>10” 
distance.  The fraction of nodes at each level for the entire sample of firms we consider is shown in the 
right-most column (“avg”). 
 
4.2 Aggregation Across a Sample of Firms:  Markov Statistics (parent-child similarities)  
As noted above in the discussion of both degree and hierarchy distributions, from 
a supervisory perspective it is not just the number (or proportion) of child nodes that 
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emanate from a parent node that matters but also the similarity between the parent and 
child.27  In this section we therefore ask the following:  Given that a node has a particular 
label s, what is the conditional (‘birth’) probability P(s|s) that the node below it also has 
label s, not just for a given firm but across a sample of firms?  Birth probabilities are one 
simple measure of a type of “homophily” in a network, or the predilection for a node (in 
this case a parent) to be connected to another node of the same kind.28    In the context of 
the rooted directed tree networks we consider, the Markov similarity statistic P(s|s) for 
label s is computed as: 
         𝑃(𝑠|𝑠) = (∑ ∑ 𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑝𝑎(𝑗) = 𝑠)
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
𝐸
𝑖=1
)
−1
∑ ∑ 𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑠)𝛿(𝑠𝑖,𝑝𝑎(𝑗) = 𝑠).
𝑁𝑖
𝑗=1
𝐸
𝑖=1
           (3) 
Note the resemblance between the second sum and the formula for the perfect tree 
similarity statistic.  In the case of the Markov similarity statistic, however, the sum is 
computed per unique value of the label s over all firms in the sample. A higher Markov 
similarity statistic indicates greater within-label (country or industry) linkage (as opposed 
to across-label linkage) and hence may suggest a greater likelihood of spillover to other 
firms with the same label.  From a financial stability perspective, if we were able to 
observe the entire network of firms, such a metric provides a measure of the degree of 
coordination burden involved in a particular dimension (e.g., with respect to that country) 
across the entire sample and hence may be useful in identifying potential contagion 
effects should a firm with a particular label (e.g., a specific country) start to exhibit signs 
                                                        
27 Although for expositional purposes much of our discussion has focused on the ease of a supervisor to 
“look below” in examining entities that are lower down the tree, our focus on the similarity between parent 
and child nodes stems from the view that consolidated reporting and risk management will be easier when, 
for example, a child has the same legal, accounting, tax, or supervisory framework as its parent. 
28 Flood et al. (2017) describe edges connecting nodes of the same kind as “homogeneous edges” in their 
paper linking intrafirm network structure to the ease of supervisory coordination. 
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of stress.  Such a statistic may help alert supervisors of high Markov-similarity countries 
or industries to the possibility of a systemic event in that country or industry.  In contrast, 
a low Markov similarity statistic may indicate greater cross-label linkage and hence may 
suggest a greater likelihood of cross-country or cross-industry contagion, pointing to the 
possibility of a global disruption to financial stability.  Discussion of the role of 
homophily in interconnected networks and its implications for financial stability and 
systemic risk are contained in Berndsen et al. (2018) and references therein. 
To illustrate, in Table 1 we compute the Markov similarity statistics for each 
country, using all firms in our sample, for both 2011 and 2013.  The probabilities vary 
dramatically for different countries.  In 2011, Canada has the highest probability, with 
P(Canada | Canada) = 0.97;  in contrast Switzerland has the lowest, with P(Switzerland | 
Switzerland) = 0.11.  Part of the reason for this variation is differences in country 
frequency; that is, even under random assignment a country that has more nodes in the 
network has a greater likelihood of being paired with its own country than does a country 
that has fewer nodes in the network.  By comparing the probabilities in 2011 to those in 
2013, however, we see that for most countries, the Markov similarity statistic increases, 
with many countries above 0.9.  This suggests that across the network of 29 firms there 
has been a shift to consolidate subsidiaries from a given country under parents from the 
same country, consistent with our prediction based on Assumptions A1-A6.  
 
4.3 Complexity and Changing Structure – Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics 
In this section we document the fluidity of majority-control hierarchies by 
comparing the perfect tree statistics in 2011 and 2013.  As is the case for many complex  
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Table 1: Within-country “birth" probabilities P(A|A) aggregated over all firms in our 
sample, 2011 and 2013.   
 
Country “A” 
2011 
 
2013 
 
P(A|A) Rank P(A|A) Rank 
Canada 0.97 1 0.974 9 
United States 0.94 2 0.958 11 
Brazil 0.93 3 0.999 2 
Malaysia 0.92 4 0.777 23 
Poland 0.86 5 0.936 14 
Russia 0.86 6 0.919 17 
Great Britain 0.86 7 0.892 21 
Norway 0.83 8 0.917 18 
Ireland 0.77 9 0.430 31 
Hong Kong 0.74 10 0.626 28 
Spain 0.67 11 0.986 6 
Jersey 0.67 12 0.200 35 
Portugal 0.63 13 0.985 7 
Czech Republic 0.62 14 0.902 20 
Sweden  0.61 15 0.867 22 
China 0.56 16 1.000 1 
Austria 0.51 17 0.914 19 
Germany 0.50 18 0.688 26 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.50 19 0.375 32 
France 0.42 20 0.926 15 
Belgium 0.35 21 0.968 10 
Italy 0.32 22 0.976 8 
Singapore 0.29 23 0.748 25 
Netherlands 0.28 24 0.648 27 
Japan 0.25 25 0.942 12 
Luxembourg 0.20 26 0.590 29 
South Africa 0.19 27 0.926 16 
Denmark 0.13 28 0.750 24 
Bermuda 0.11 29 0.209 34 
Switzerland 0.11 30 0.456 30 
Mexico   0.997 3 
India   0.995 4 
Kenya   0.345 33 
Argentina   0.987 5 
Australia   0.940 13 
 
Notes to Table 3. This table summarizes the “in” transition statistics with respect to country labels. That is, 
for any country A consider all the subsidiaries incorporated in A. Here we list the proportion of the children 
of such subsidiaries that are also incorporated in A (P(A|A)) for any country where in 2011 the in-country 
probability is neither zero or one, along with some additional countries from 2013. 
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systems, the structure of the majority-control hierarchy is a response to a variety of 
endogenous and exogenous forces. A significant component of the latter comes from 
regulatory frameworks, which can include pressures that come from tax and corporate 
legal structures as well as supervisory restrictions on activities.  For example, in 
December 2012, the lowering of the threshold for consolidated supervision as a result of 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 went into effect.   Because our two data snapshots straddle 
this event, we can use our sample to illustrate how our metrics might be used to study or 
evaluate changes in policy. 
 
4.3.1 Country Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the country-level perfect tree statistics and bootstrapping 
simulations for each firm and both dates, grouped by firm type (SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, 
and insurance companies).  For each firm and each date, four statistics are reported:  (1) 
the firm’s “actual” perfect tree statistic (described in Section 3.4), (2) the mean of the 
same statistic computed over all replications of that firm’s simulated data, (3) the 
standard deviation over all replications, (4) the empirical quantile corresponding to where 
the observed statistic would lie in the empirical distribution generated from the 
replications (that is, the percentage of replications that resulted in a statistic that was less 
than the firm’s observed statistic).   
It is important to note that while perfect tree statistics of different values can be 
compared within a single firm (i.e., a lower value means more subsidiaries are different 
from their immediate parent than a higher value), care needs to be taken when comparing 
these statistics across firms because some empirical label distributions are more easily 
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Table 2.  Country Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics  
Notes to Table 4: Summary statistics describing the regularity of a firm’s country control hierarchy for two periods in 
time, May 26, 2011 (left panel) and February 25, 2013 (right panel).  The columns labeled “Perfect” refer to the perfect 
tree-similarity statistic equal to the number of nodes that have the same country designation as their immediate parent 
divided by the total number of nodes in the firm’s tree.   In a perfect tree, deletion of a node and its children will not 
change the value of the statistic.  From a supervisory perspective, this means that supervisory oversight follows firm 
organizational lines.  A number closer to one signifies greater proximity to perfect.   The columns “Mean”, “Stdev” and 
“Quantile” are summary statistics computed over all replications of the simulated data, where each firm’s tree structure 
is taken as given and the node identifiers are randomly drawn according to the conditional probability distribution of 
the firm’s observed tree.  See section 3.2 for details.   
 May 26, 2011  February 25, 2013 
 Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile  Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile 
SIFIs 
S1 0.776 0.677 0.349 27.63%  0.850 0.523 0.271 84.98% 
S2 0.351 0.362 0.330 58.43%  0.609 0.571 0.253 47.51% 
S3 0.526 0.375 0.209 75.75%  0.727 0.527 0.212 84.97% 
S4 0.800 0.615 0.364 47.97%  0.987 0.950 0.089 100% 
S5 0.529 0.275 0.181 97.92%  0.964 0.869 0.205 100% 
S6 0.651 0.397 0.387 65.96%  0.939 0.784 0.220 100% 
S7 0.906 0.799 0.237 99.47%  0.834 0.574 0.232 92.58% 
S8 0.869 0.655 0.308 58.19%  0.953 0.732 0.204 98.10% 
S9 0.895 0.831 0.272 33.57%  0.953 0.875 0.198 43.97% 
S10 0.261 0.258 0.127 53.79%  0.925 0.712 0.217 100% 
S11 0.279 0.094 0.051 100%  0.939 0.795 0.226 100% 
S12 0.264 0.096 0.081 93.39%  0.942 0.777 0.244 100% 
S13 0.857 0.693 0.343 35.08%  0.951 0.794 0.218 100% 
S14 0.864 0.746 0.341 29.33%  0.908 0.532 0.239 100% 
S15 0.895 0.639 0.243 100%  0.924 0.684 0.239 99.53% 
S16 0.860 0.665 0.218 100%  0.826 0.539 0.243 99.71% 
S17 0.575 0.349 0.200 90.20%  0.856 0.445 0.154 100% 
S18 0.963 0.896 0.173 67.42%  0.973 0.899 0.201 99.94% 
S19 0.933 0.854 0.164 100%  0.935 0.726 0.300 100% 
Mean 0.687 0.541    0.894 0.700   
Non-SIFIs 
B1 0.962 0.903 0.129 99.61%  0.959 0.881 0.161 100% 
B2 0.941 0.830 0.255 37.04%  0.991 0.956 0.090 100% 
B3 0.520 0.159 0.136 100%  0.510 0.157 0.135 97.16% 
B4 0.669 0.374 0.241 100%  0.990 0.964 0.107 99.98% 
B5 0.429 0.183 0.091 100%  0.783 0.428 0.241 99.96% 
Mean 0.704 0.490    0.847 0.677   
Insurance Companies 
I1 0.665 0.536 0.367 41.18%  0.862 0.569 0.231 91.43% 
I2 0.297 0.181 0.171 64.52%  0.752 0.384 0.190 99.74% 
I3 0.576 0.281 0.270 79.46%  0.744 0.373 0.167 100% 
I4 0.857 0.718 0.338 34.77%  0.884 0.602 0.230 90.91% 
I5 0.781 0.626 0.254 60.35%  0.909 0.558 0.205 99.91% 
Mean 0.635 0.468    0.830 0.497   Jo
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shuffled to achieve proximity to a perfect tree than others.   For this reason, it is useful 
also to consider the moments and/or quantiles generated using the perfect tree 
simulations.   For example, a comparison of S9 and S11 in 2011 reveals that although S9 
has a perfect tree statistic that is close to one, the arrangement of its subsidiaries is 
actually far from perfect (falling in the lowest third of the simulated distribution).   In 
contrast, S11 has a much lower perfect tree statistic (0.279) but is in the 100% quantile 
compared to other control hierarchies that could result from its given country distribution, 
meaning that the simulations produced no better way to arrange the subsidiaries for this 
firm (i.e., in a manner that would result in less coordination burden among supervisors) 
than the observed arrangement.   
In 2011, nine of the 29 firms had country structures that were significantly 
different from their corresponding perfect tree, given their topology (that is, a test of the 
null hypothesis that the firm’s perfect tree similarity statistic is equal to one is rejected).   
In addition, 25 of 29 firms had country distributions that differed from a structure where 
all subsidiaries differ from their immediate parent (that is, a test of the null hypothesis 
that the firm’s perfect tree similarity statistic is equal to zero is also rejected), suggesting 
most firms have majority-control structure that follows geographical lines.  By 2013, only 
one firm had a country structure that was significantly different from its corresponding 
perfect tree and for all firms, the null hypothesis that the firm’s perfect tree similarity 
statistic is equal to zero was rejected, corroborating the results of the Markov statistics of 
a shift toward geographical consolidation. 
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4.3.2 SIC Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics 
Table 3 summarizes the 2-digit SIC-level perfect tree simulations for each firm 
and both dates, again grouped by firm type.29  Similar to the country tree statistics, while 
in 11 of the 29 firms we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the firms have 2-digit SIC 
structures where all subsidiaries differ from their immediate parent in 2011 (perfect tree 
statistic is equal to zero), by 2013 the hypothesis is rejected for all of the firms’ structures 
(at the 95% level of confidence).  The results document a shift toward a perfect tree 
configuration; all except one firm’s perfect tree similarity statistic (S19) increased and the 
number of firms with SIC perfect tree-similarity significantly less than one fell from 20 to 
10.  Nonetheless, in many cases the change in 2-digit SIC structure did not actually 
render the firms less complex, as the associated quantile declined for 14 of 29 firms. 
An interesting example from this table is S18.  From Table A1, we know that this 
firm experienced a modest (13%) reduction in nodes between 2011 and 2013, despite 
adding five additional countries to its majority-control hierarchy.  Over the same period, 
it reduced its number of SIC categories by more than 50% and doubled its degree depth.    
As noted above in Section 4.2, the increased degree depth is an indication of a 
shift toward a more bureaucratic organizational structure.  Commensurate with this 
change, the firm’s country perfect tree statistic increased both in level and quantile (see 
Table 4), indicating that the new control hierarchy was closer to a segmented structure, 
where children mimic the country of their immediate parent.  This shift to a more  
                                                        
29 We use 2-digit SIC classifications for computation of the perfect tree similarity statistic rather than the 
more granular 4-digit since the former will be farther away from the lower bound of zero and hence is more 
informative for illustrative purposes.  In practice, of course, these statistics may be computed at whichever 
level of granularity is deemed most appropriate, i.e., the statistics also could be computed using 1-, 3-, or 4-
digit granularity if desired, recognizing that higher levels of granularity involve increased computational 
time for the associated simulations required for inference. 
Jo
u n
al
Pre
-p
oo
f
38 
 
Table 3.  SIC Perfect Tree Similarity Statistics  
Notes to Table 5: Summary statistics describing the regularity of a firm’s SIC control hierarchy for two periods in time, 
May 26, 2011 (left panel) and February 25, 2013 (right panel).  The columns labeled “Perfect” refer to the perfect tree-
similarity statistic equal to the number of nodes that have the same SIC designation as their immediate parent divided 
by the total number of nodes in the firm’s tree.   In a perfect tree, deletion of a node and its children will not change the 
value of the statistic.  From a supervisory perspective, this means that supervisory oversight follows firm organizational 
lines.  A number closer to one signifies greater proximity to perfect.   The columns “Mean”, “Stdev” and “Quantile” are 
summary statistics computed over all replications of the simulated data, where each firm’s tree structure is taken as 
given and the node identifiers are randomly drawn according to the conditional probability distribution of the firm’s 
observed tree.  See section 3.2 for details. 
 May 26, 2011  February 25, 2013 
 Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile  Perfect Mean Stdev Quantile 
SIFIs 
S1 0.305 0.069 0.071 99.94%  0.631 0.376 0.158 99.25% 
S2 0.103 0.063 0.036 81.66%  0.466 0.649 0.197 18.33% 
S3 0.092 0.053 0.041 90.03%  0.575 0.358 0.169 99.99% 
S4 0.561 0.704 0.301 28.95%  0.955 0.917 0.133 32.60% 
S5  0.089 0.064 0.066 79.74%  0.940 0.885 0.174 54.21% 
S6 0.435 0.300 0.314 64.14%  0.830 0.731 0.191 51.65% 
S7 0.022 0.090 0.028 6.26%  0.601 0.384 0.195 79.31% 
S8 0.473 0.467 0.272 45.21%  0.754 0.663 0.180 61.85% 
S9 0.359 0.360 0.194 42.19%  0.841 0.666 0.261 56.91% 
S10 0.032 0.044 0.026 42.63%  0.767 0.591 0.257 59.14% 
S11 0.465 0.283 0.107 94.64%  0.938 0.869 0.134 90.72% 
S12 0.170 0.273 0.170 36.56%  0.820 0.749 0.229 42.85% 
S13 0.856 0.565 0.313 94.99%  0.879 0.794 0.182 50.48% 
S14 0.078 0.115 0.101 50.96%  0.706 0.410 0.268 76.23% 
S15 0.683 0.489 0.217 79.96%  0.784 0.583 0.171 93.88% 
S16 0.417 0.262 0.169 69.79%  0.491 0.517 0.157 37.28% 
S17 0.291 0.160 0.118 85.78%  0.471 0.211 0.056 100% 
S18 0.666 0.501 0.203 73.02%  0.844 0.721 0.252 39.30% 
S19 0.836 0.676 0.227 75.03%  0.755 0.432 0.265 92.38% 
Mean 0.365 0.291    0.739 0.606   
Non-SIFIs 
B1 0.754 0.651 0.261 52.07%  0.871 0.754 0.240 53.46% 
B2 0.621 0.360 0.303 66.37%  0.968 0.930 0.122 64.92% 
B3 0.276 0.117 0.077 96.83%  0.671 0.447 0.259 67.00% 
B4 0.103 0.037 0.033 90.63%  0.957 0.933 0.155 16.40% 
B5 0.302 0.213 0.110 71.40%  0.659 0.552 0.284 44.54% 
Mean 0.411 0.276    0.825 0.723   
Insurance Companies 
I1 0.375 0.433 0.299 45.65%  0.546 0.366 0.167 85.66% 
I2 0.212 0.112 0.042 98.46%  0.488 0.272 0.081 99.33% 
I3 0.125 0.069 0.047 84.64%  0.596 0.432 0.210 63.10% 
I4 0.478 0.415 0.246 54.83%  0.497 0.401 0.126 71.40% 
I5 0.119 0.055 0.018 99.78%  0.564 0.371 0.112 96.94% 
Mean 0.262 0.217    0.538 0.368   Jo
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divisional arrangement was not without cost, however;  from Table 3 despite more 
parent-child SIC alignment (the perfect tree statistic increased from 0.666 to 0.844), the 
resultant firm was less functionally-arranged as it dropped from the 73rd percentile to the 
39th percentile in its proximity to a perfect tree. 
 
4.3.3 Additional Thoughts 
As noted in Section 3, complexity in our framework is a multidimensional concept.  It 
is evident from a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 that while in many cases inference 
regarding a firm’s complexity may be similar in the two dimensions we consider (i.e., 
country and SIC), in other cases the two dimensions may conflict, for example with a 
firm having a fairly complex country-label topology and a not-so-complex SIC-label 
topology, or vice versa.30  In principle, such conflict can be addressed by redefining (and 
expanding) the label space to accommodate all possible label pairs (i.e., all country-SIC 
combinations).  This framework also can be used to consider additional types of labels 
beyond just country and SIC classifications (e.g., by activity), were such information 
available.  More generally one can define labels via n-tuples, where n represents the 
number of properties that describe each node.  In practice, however, such a definitional 
expansion soon becomes computationally prohibitive. 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 A similar point is made by Carmassi and Herring (2015) in discussion of their subsidiarization proposal 
(discussed above) where they note, “Subsidiarization does not provide a complete solution to the problem 
of corporate complexity, because subsidiaries can be organized on the basis of their location or on the basis 
of the kind of business conducted, but these approaches often conflict.”   
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5. Discussion 
In this section we provide some thoughts to illustrate how results such as ours might be 
used in policy discussion and the implications of our findings for both the determination 
of systemic importance and financial stability.   We emphasize that due to our limited 
sample, the remarks are offered as a proof-of-concept rather than intended to be 
definitive. 
 
5.1. Are the SIFIs in our sample really more complex from a supervisory perspective? 
 In Table A1, we see that in 2011 SIFIs had tree structures with more than three 
times as many nodes, higher degree depth, greater geographical reach and more than 
double the amount of 4-digit SIC variation in their subsidiaries than both non-SIFI banks 
and insurance companies.  In addition, data from Bloomberg® on total consolidated 
assets of all firms in our sample reveal that on average the SIFIs had $1.82tr in total 
consolidated assets as compared to $0.72tr for the non-SIFI banks and $0.61tr for the 
insurance companies in our dataset.  So do our complexity measures tell a regulator 
anything more about the appropriateness of a systemic importance designation than can 
be gleaned from simply looking at the size of an institution?   
Note that in asking this question, we do not mean to downplay the relevance of 
the other metrics (e.g., number of nodes, tree depth, etc.) or to suggest that our perfect 
tree similarity statistic is the only important property (or even the most important 
property) of a majority-control hierarchy network.  To reiterate, we consider the term 
“complexity” from a supervisory perspective regarding the topology of the firm, namely: 
(1) how difficult is it for a consolidated supervisor to access the information it needs to 
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assess the firm, (2) how likely are they to identify a problem with the firm if it exists, and 
(3) how easily can a problem be mitigated/remedied once identified?  Recall our 
assumption in this context is that the closer a firm’s control hierarchy is to a perfect tree, 
the easier will be its access to needed information.   
From this supervisory perspective, one might at first glance consider the SIFI sample 
to be on average more complex than either the non-SIFI bank or insurance company 
samples, as a result of the SIFI sample’s much more elaborate control hierarchies based 
on the dimensions given in the data (# of nodes, countries, SIC groups, and degree 
depth).  Yet for the most part the SIFI sample also had a greater proportion of child nodes 
that were from the same country or SIC classification as their immediate parent than did 
the insurance companies. Importantly, given their elaborate control hierarchy, the firms in 
the SIFI sample were in many cases closer to a perfect tree than most of the simulated 
trees, judging from their quantile position.  Thus the SIFIs in our sample may not 
necessarily present greater supervisory challenges, despite their larger size and more 
elaborate structures, assuming sufficient oversight in each country and industry.    Put 
another way, the ability of a firm to quickly reduce its exposure with respect to a specific 
country or industry appears to be similar between the SIFI and non-SIFI bank samples.  
In contrast, the sample of insurance companies in 2011 appears to be more complex, with 
more extensive cross-country and cross-industry reporting structures, that might prove 
harder to untangle in a crisis.  For this reason, we believe our proposed intrafirm metrics 
may be a useful complement in the supervisory context to the more general well-
established network metrics that are used to evaluate interconnected networks.  We 
emphasize that at this stage, our findings are merely suggestive and not conclusive, given 
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the subsample of data that we have for analysis.  Of course it remains to be seen whether 
our findings also appear in a larger, representative sample. 
 
5.2.   Is size a sufficient statistic? 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, calls to end “too big to fail,” the so-
called practice of bailing out the largest, most systemically important financial 
institutions, have intensified.  Most often, the concept of too big to fail implies a firm 
whose size is larger than a specified threshold.  Yet size is but one of the criteria 
mentioned in the SIFI definition.31    
Consistent with the idea that size and systemic importance are synonymous, 
regulators typically delineate a size threshold to identify firms that pose considerable risk 
to the global financial system.  Despite the ease of implementation, a size-based threshold 
is in many ways unsatisfactory, precisely because it does not take into account the level 
of complexity of a firm’s business activities.  To quantify this point more generally, we 
computed the Pearson rank correlation between total consolidated assets and both 
country- and SIC- perfect tree similarity statistics.32  The rank correlation was -0.32 and  
-0.36, respectively.  In contrast, the rank correlation between size and the number of 
nodes was 0.58, reflecting the fact that firms with more total consolidated assets 
generally have more subsidiaries.   Taken together, these numbers highlight the fact that 
the link between asset size, number of subsidiaries, and the number of countries and 
                                                        
31 There are a variety of definitions of size that arise in the banking and finance literature.  The most 
common in recent banking regulations (e.g., Basel II, Basel III, Dodd-Frank) is specified in terms of total 
consolidated assets.  Other definitions might include market capitalization, number of distinct entities, 
number of employees.   Generally speaking, however, in the “too big to fail” context, size is usually 
considered in financial (e.g., dollar) terms, rather than in terms of features of organizational structure. 
32 We report results using rank-based statistics in order to preserve confidentiality of the firms.  The results 
are qualitatively similar using ln(assets). 
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industries in which a firm operates is not exact;  that is, the perfect tree statistics are 
measuring something different than just the number of nodes.   This point is also 
illustrated in Figure 5, comparing the ranks of the firms’ size to the ranks of their country 
(left chart) and SIC (right chart) perfect tree similarity statistics.  In particular, if size and 
the perfect-tree statistics measured the same thing, we would expect the points in this 
figure to lie along the 45-degree line.  Instead there is a slight negative relationship, 
particularly among the SIFI firms; the larger firms are less complex from a supervisory 
standpoint, with a larger proportion of trees being self-contained (where the child node is 
in the same country as its immediate parent). 
To see how such information might be used in practice, we offer two examples: 
(1) Firms S4 and S5 have very similar asset-size, yet in 2013 S4 has three times as many 
subsidiaries (nodes) and activities in 50% more industries than S5.  In contrast, it is 
only active in half as many countries.   Hence the supervisory challenges associated 
with these firms may be very different, S4 requiring coordination among many more 
industry regulators and S5 requiring substantial coordination among different country 
supervisors.  Yet both their country and SIC perfect tree-similarity statistics are 
similar and close to one.  And while their country perfect tree similarity statistics 
would place them both at the 100% quantile (i.e., closer to a perfect tree than all  
simulated firms with identical tree structure), S4’s SIC statistic, while higher in value 
than S5’s, is below the 33rd percentile (by comparison, S5’s is just below the 54th 
percentile).  Taken together, these statistics would alert regulators to the SIC 
dimension of S4’s business.  Note from Table A1 that the absolute number of 4-digit 
SIC activities of S4 is not particularly unusual:  there are 12 firms that have  
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Figure 5.  Scatter plot of firms’ size rank versus country and SIC tree similarity ranks.  These charts 
show the distribution of size rank (in terms of 2012 total consolidated assets) versus 2013 country (top 
chart) and SIC (bottom chart) tree similarity ranks, for all 29 firms in our sample, shown separately for 
SIFIs, non-SIFI banks, and insurance companies. A higher rank indicates greater complexity and/or larger 
size.  While it is evident that the non-SIFI banks and insurance companies are smaller in size than the SIFIs, 
there is also evidence that the insurance companies have country and SIC perfect tree similarity statistics 
that are farther from a perfect tree (i.e., they are more intermingled and hence potentially more difficult to 
supervise/regulate).  In contrast, the non-SIFI banks are similar to their SIFI counterparts in that some have 
tree structures that are close to perfect and others far away.   Data on size as of December 31, 2012 are 
obtained from Bloomberg®. 
 
subsidiaries in a greater number of industries.   Yet there is only one firm (S2) that has a 
2-digit SIC perfect tree similarity statistic with a lower quantile score. 
(2) Another comparison of interest is between S6 and S12.   These two firms are very 
similar in their perfect tree similarity statistics (both country and SIC), as well as the 
quantiles to which these statistics correspond. Both firms’ SIC quantiles are near the 
median of the simulated distribution for their corresponding tree structures and hence 
might warrant additional supervision.  Yet S6 is nearly 50% bigger in asset size and 
has more than four times the number of subsidiaries (nodes) than S12.  A size-only 
threshold would potentially miss the complexity of S12. 
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Finally, Cohen and Lou (2012) use a Herfindahl-type measure to assess how complicated 
a firm is, computed as the sum of squared percentages of each business type (e.g., 0.42 
+0.32 + 0.32 if there are three types that comprise 40%, 30%, and 30% of the firm’s 
overall business) but do not take into account the topology of the firm’s organizational 
structure.  The closer their measure is to one, the less complicated a firm is.  To compare 
our work to this important paper, using our 2011 data we analogously compute indices 
that measure the country and SIC concentration of our firms.  The correlation between 
these indices and our perfect tree statistics is 0.83 (country) and 0.72 (SIC).  Yet when we 
consider the rank correlation between the indices and the perfect tree statistic quantiles, 
there is a negative relationship, providing further evidence that our complexity metric is 
detecting something different than business concentration.33 
 
5.3. Has complexity of the firms in our sample changed over time? 
A comparison of the left and right blocks of columns in Table 2 and 3 (corresponding to 
results as of May 26, 2011, and February 25, 2013, respectively), reveals a number of 
interesting observations: 
 In 2011, four of the 29 firms had country structures that were not significantly 
different from a random tree structure (a perfect tree similarity statistic of zero).  By 
2013, all of the firms’ structures differed.    
 Despite their nonrandom structure, in the 21 months between May 2011 and February 
2013, the firms in our sample substantially reduced their level of geographical 
complexity.  In the earlier sample, nine firms (6 SIFIs, 2 non-SIFI banks, and 1 
                                                        
33 The values of the indices and scatter plots comparing the ranks discussed in this paragraph are available 
on request. 
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insurance company) had country structures that were statistically significantly 
different from a perfect tree (a perfect tree similarity statistic of one), while by 2013, 
only one (B3) remained.  Carmassi and Herring (2015) also note that complexity 
(defined as the number of subsidiaries of a firm) has declined since 2011. 
 The reduction in geographical complexity was partially achieved through a change in 
structure and reduction in geographical intraconnectedness for each firm.  For 24 of 
the 29 firms, the country perfect-tree similarity statistic moved closer to one. In 
addition, 20 firms experienced quantile increases as a result of their change in 
structure between the two years, indicating closer proximity to a perfect tree structure.  
In addition, over all 29 firms the range of statistics narrowed (from [0.261 to 0.963] in 
2011 to [0.510 to 0.991] in 2013).   
 By 2013, most firms were in the very upper tail of their respective country perfect 
tree distributions, with nearly half of the statistics above all of the simulated values 
corresponding to their firm’s structure (quantile = 100%). 
 In contrast, while most firms’ SIC structure moved more closely to a perfect tree in 
2013 (i.e., the number of firms with SIC perfect tree-similarity statistic significantly 
less than one fell by 50%, from 20 to 10), the associated quantiles declined in almost 
half the firms, indicating that the change in SIC structure did not commensurately 
reduce the firms’ complexity along this dimension. 
 As noted above, supervisors might also use measures such as these to inform their 
choices of which firms merit additional scrutiny.  For example, for firm S2, despite an 
increase in its county and SIC perfect tree similarity statistics between 2011 and 
2013, the associated quantiles declined from 58.42% to 47.51% for the country 
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perfect tree similarity statistic and from 81.66% to 18.33% for the SIC perfect tree 
similarity statistic, indicating that the firm’s geographical and industry complexity 
may not have declined commensurately with the change in structure.  
 
Taken together, these results indicate some reduction in country and SIC complexity for 
most of the firms in our sample.  While the firms in our SIFI sample have made the most 
progress, there have also been large changes in the non-bank SIFIs and insurance 
company samples.  There is little evidence that the increase in size as a result of the post-
2008 financial crisis consolidation of the banking sector has led to greater jurisdictional 
complexity; for most firms, coordination with respect to both supervisory oversight and 
possible wind-down or paring of assets would be easier now, given their organizational 
structure, than in 2011.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the risks that large, multinational, complex, 
interconnected banks pose.  Since then, debate concerning which firms warrant a SIFI 
designation has led to a large amount of research into the web of interconnections 
inherent in financial transaction networks and the associated risk to the global 
financial system.  There has been comparatively less emphasis on the risks that a 
firms’ internal complexity might pose, particularly the coordination challenges for 
supervisors tasked with evaluating a firm’s riskiness on a consolidated basis.   As 
noted by Carmassi and Herring (2014): 
“[Also,] opacity of organizational structures impedes regulatory oversight.  If 
regulators do not have a clear understanding of how lines of business map into 
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legal entities and how the legal entities interact with each other, they cannot 
perform effective prudential supervision, nor can they implement an orderly 
resolution” 
 
“Information tends to flow more freely within a regulatory organization than 
between organizations and more freely among regulatory institutions within a 
country than across national borders.” 
 
In this paper, we propose using a firm’s control hierarchy as a proxy for such 
supervisory challenges.   By defining complexity as a function of the firm’s tree topology 
we demonstrate that complexity and size are not synonymous and thus warrant distinct 
mention in the FSB’s SIFI definition.  We additionally propose using a perfect tree 
similarity statistic to quantify the ease of supervision in a number of dimensions:  (1) a 
consolidated supervisor’s need to rely on coordination or information from supervisors 
from other countries, (2) the implications of severing the link to a subsidiary, and (3) the 
ability to assess how to wind down a firm through paring of subsidiaries with minimal 
risk.34  By comparing data from 2011 and 2013, we find that on average the ease of 
supervision along these dimensions improved.  While our data sample prevents definitive 
conclusions regarding this improvement, one possible reason is the 2012 lowering of the 
threshold under which subsidiaries must submit to consolidated supervision. Although 
purely speculative at this stage, the pattern that we have observed in our data, namely of 
dramatic increases in the  number of nodes and decreases in the level of complexity as 
defined by our metrics, is consistent with what we would expect from such a change in 
                                                        
34 Although we have emphasized the potential value of our metrics to the supervisory/regulatory 
community, it is also worth noting that our metrics additionally might be useful as measures of operational 
risk.  The Risk Management Association on their website (http://www.rmahq.org/operational-
risk/?gmssopc=1, accessed 8/12/16) notes, “The definition of operational risk is the risk of loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from external events, but is better 
viewed as the risk arising from the execution of an institution’s business functions.”  We thank several 
people at various conferences and seminars where an early version of this paper was presented for 
mentioning this connection to operational risk. 
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threshold.  No doubt other explanations are possible.   In addition, our results suggest that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, some of the SIFI-designated institutions may not pose 
greater supervisory challenge since their control hierarchy more closely resembles a 
perfect tree than some of the other firms in our sample.   Specifically, we find little 
difference between the SIFI and non-SIFI banks in our sample.  In contrast, the insurance 
companies in our sample are more complex according to the perfect tree similarity 
statistics, despite being smaller in size, having fewer subsidiaries, and being less 
geographically or industry-diverse than the banks.  We emphasize, however, that our 
sample is highly selected and that generalizability of these findings remains a topic for 
further research. 
In closing we stress the importance of further development of metrics aimed at 
measuring complexity as it relates to the challenges of supervisory oversight and 
coordination.  As a key aspect of the FSB’s definition of systemic importance, viable 
measures of complexity are critical to ensuring financial stability.  In this paper, we make 
the argument that the firms’ topology may provide insights into the challenges that 
external supervisors are known to face.  In our view, the metrics proposed in this paper 
represent just the beginning of the discussion on this topic.   We emphasize that, distinct 
from size and interconnectedness, much work on complexity remains to be done. 
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Appendix A: List of Financial Institutions and basic descriptive statistics 
This is the list of financial institutions analyzed in this paper, broken out into banks and 
insurance companies and grouped by country of incorporation.35 Those that are among 
the twenty-nine systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), as determined by the 
FSB and IMF, are preceded by an asterisk. The country of incorporation is included in 
parentheses. For completeness, the SIFIs that are not included in our dataset (as a result 
of not being managed by Kingland Systems, the data provider) are also listed.  
 
Banks  Banks (continued) 
   
*Bank of America (US)   Nomura (JP) 
*Citigroup (US)   *Sumitomo Mitsui FG (JP) 
*Goldman Sachs (US)   *ING Groep NV (NL) 
*JP Morgan Chase (US)     
*Morgan Stanley (US)   Insurance Companies 
  Royal Bank of Canada (CA)   
*Credit Suisse AG (CH)  Allianz (DE) 
*UBS AG (CH)  Aviva (GB) 
*Deutsche Bank AG (DE)  Axa (FR) 
*Banco Santander SA (ES)  Swiss Re (CH) 
  BBVA (ES)  Zurich (CH) 
*BNP Paribas SA (FR)   
*Société Générale SA (FR)  SIFIs not included in the dataset: 
*Barclays PLC (GB)  [*Bank of China (CN)] 
*HSBC Holdings PLC (GB)   [*Banque Populaire (FR)] 
*Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (GB)   [*Commerzbank (DE)] 
  Standard Chartered (GB)  [*Crédit Agricole (FR)] 
  Banca Intesa (IT)  [*Dexia (BE) ] 
*UniCredit (IT)*  [*Lloyds (GB)] 
*Mitsubishi UFJ FG (JP)  [*Nordea (SW)] 
*Mizuho FG (JP)  [*Wells Fargo (US)] 
 
 
In Table A1 on the next page, we present some basic descriptive statistics about the 
(anonymized) firms in our sample, giving for each firm the total number of nodes 
(subsidiaries) in its tree, the number of distinct countries and 4-digit SIC codes 
represented by the nodes, and the number of levels (i.e., depth) of each tree.  The table 
illustrates the variation in tree structure across the firms and across time.  In particular, in 
2011 the number of nodes in a tree ranges from 43 to 16,443; the number of distinct 
countries and 4-digit SIC codes represented by the nodes ranges from 10 to 89 and 13 to 
281, respectively.   In addition, the tree depth varies from 2 to 7.  By 2013, there is less 
variation across firms.   The number of nodes in a tree ranges from 330 to 12,752 while 
the number of distinct countries and 4-digit SIC codes ranges from 23 to 86 and 27 to 
164, respectively.   The decline in number of countries and 4-digit SIC codes is offset by 
the increase in tree depth for all but two firms, likely a result of post-crisis acquisitions.  
For some firms the increase in tree depth is substantial:  for example, firm S17 increased 
from a tree depth of 4 in 2011 to 20 in 2013. 
                                                        
35 This is the list that was in effect at the time the initial data collection took place (2011).   Since then, the 
Financial Stability Board has issued a revised list every November.  The SIFI status of all of the banks we 
analyze has not changed since the initial list.  See Financial Stability Board (2019) for the most recent list.   
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Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes to Table A1: Basic descriptive information and statistics on the control hierarchies for the twenty-
nine institutions in our sample at two points in time:  May 26, 2011 and February 25, 2013. #Nodes is the 
total number of nodes in the hierarchy; #Countries is the number of different countries that occur in the 
hierarchy; #SIC is the number of different four-digit SIC codes that occur in the hierarchy; Depth is the 
number of levels in the hierarchy tree. 
  
 May 26, 2011  February 25, 2013 
 #Nodes #Countries #SIC Depth  #Nodes #Countries #SIC Depth 
SIFIs 
S1 1007 34 72 3  1519 57 60 4 
S2 887 40 133 3  1585 47 59 10 
S3 2568 55 210 5  4001 70 125 7 
S4 1897 37 72 4  12752 33 86 6 
S5 1034 42 122 3  4272 56 57 5 
S6 3221 87 210 5  7289 73 96 7 
S7 5850 58 198 4  5477 72 164 11 
S8 6483 68 157 4  9564 76 147 9 
S9 5502 48 194 5  8455 47 127 9 
S10 1815 35 222 7  4012 48 107 8 
S11 43 14 16 4  1468 23 34 5 
S12 53 18 13 2  1520 29 45 5 
S13 935 32 46 5  2224 32 46 5 
S14 9815 76 281 5  3243 56 152 13 
S15 9084 89 240 6  10211 86 127 9 
S16 1778 32 100 5  2545 50 86 11 
S17 2334 49 250 4  1117 38 104 20 
S18 11487 47 279 6  10077 52 134 12 
S19 16443 58 172 6  11231 61 114 7 
Mean 4328 48 157 4.5  5398 53 98 8.6 
Non-SIFI Banks 
B1 2678 19 72 4  2378 30 65 5 
B2 1998 20 110 4  9079 31 63 4 
B3 127 37 26 5  681 50 49 7 
B4 475 32 147 3  7006 29 53 6 
B5 205 28 34 3  387 29 42 5 
Mean 1097 27 78 3.8  3906 34 54 5.4 
Insurance Companies 
I1 793 40 48 5  1373 39 67 6 
I2 118 25 27 5  330 30 27 6 
I3 1564 74 154 3  2738 81 131 7 
I4 1752 54 98 4  2544 48 86 7 
I5 379 10 47 4  1254 33 67 9 
Mean 921 41 75 4.2  1648 46 76 7.0 Jo
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Appendix B:  The Federal Reserve’s Responsibility for Consolidated Supervision 
 
The following are relevant passages from the Bank Holding Company Supervision 
Manual (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2017) regarding the Federal 
Reserve’s responsibility as consolidated supervisor (all page section numbers quoted 
from this source).   
 
1. “The BHC Act provides for all BHCs, including financial holding companies formed 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), to be supervised on a consolidated basis 
by the Federal Reserve.  Consolidated supervision of a BHC encompasses the parent 
company and its subsidiaries, and allows the Federal Reserve to understand the 
organization’s structure, activities, resources, and risks, as well as to address 
financial, managerial, operational, or other deficiencies before they pose a danger to 
the BHC’s subsidiary depository institutions.” (page 61) 
 
Consolidated supervision is important not just for the US but for other countries;  thus 
any metrics we develop that can aid consolidated supervision will be relevant beyond  
just the US and Federal Reserve supervision. 
 
2. “The Federal Reserve’s consolidated supervision program has served as the 
benchmark for many of the current and evolving international standards for the 
consolidated supervision of financial groups. Key concepts that have been part of the 
Federal Reserve’s approach to consolidated supervision for many years are reflected 
in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Minimum Standards for 
Internationally Active Banks (1992), capital accords (1988 and 2006), and Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997 and 2006), and are now used by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in connection with their 
assessments of countries’ bank supervisory regimes.” (page 62) 
 
The next passage highlights the Federal Reserve’s assumed link between microprudential 
evaluation of an individual firm and financial stability. 
 
3. “The consolidated supervision framework has two primary objectives:  (1) enhancing 
resiliency of a firm to lower the probability of its failure or inability to serve as a 
financial intermediary, (2) reducing the impact on the financial system and the 
broader economy in the event of a firm’s failure or material weakness” (section 
2124.05).  “The Federal Reserve’s approach to consolidated supervision 
<is>…designed to further the objectives of fostering financial stability and deterring 
or managing the potential for possible financial crises.” (Page 57).   
 
The next passages highlight the need for coordination and reliance on information from 
other regulators (including state regulators) to avoid duplication of effort and links this to 
business model. 
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4. Throughout the Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, and stated explicitly 
e.g., on page 61: “The guidance reiterates the importance of coordination with, and 
reliance on, the work of other relevant primary supervisors and functional regulators”.  
“Effective consolidated supervision requires strong, cooperative relationships 
between the Federal Reserve and relevant primary supervisors and functional 
regulators.” (page 62).  “Information sharing among domestic and foreign 
supervisors, consistent with applicable law and the jurisdiction of each supervisor, is 
essential to ensure that a banking organization’s global activities are supervised on a 
consolidated basis.” (page 63).  “For example, more independent Federal Reserve 
work typically will be required to assess consolidated asset quality or earnings for 
large complex BHCs with significant nonbank activities that are not functionally 
regulated. However, where all material holding company assets are concentrated in a 
single depository institution subsidiary, a minimal level of incremental Federal 
Reserve efforts typically will be required to assess consolidated asset quality and 
earnings.” (page 84).  “The Federal Reserve’s conduct of consolidated supervision is 
central to and dependent on the coordination with, and reliance on, the work of other 
relevant primary supervisors and functional regulators.” (page 374)  “Many large 
complex institutions have interstate operations that expand with the continuation of 
mergers and acquisitions. In this environment, close cooperation with the other 
federal and state banking agencies is critical.” (page 563). 
 
The next quotes note the challenges for large multinational BHCs and link these 
challenges to macroprudential supervision. 
 
5. “Financial trouble in one part of an organization can spread rapidly to other parts of 
the organization; moreover, large BHCs increasingly operate and manage their 
businesses on an integrated basis across corporate boundaries. Risks that cross legal 
entities or that are managed on a consolidated basis cannot be monitored properly 
through supervision directed at any one of the legal entity subsidiaries within the 
overall organization.” (page 61) “There are, however, areas of focus for the Federal 
Reserve that are unique to a holding company’s international operations. For 
example, some host-country legal and regulatory structures and supervisory 
approaches are fundamentally different from those in the United States. As a result, 
the banking organization often must devote additional resources to maintain expertise 
in local regulatory requirements. In some instances, privacy concerns have led to 
limits on the information a BHC’s foreign office may share with its parent company, 
thereby limiting the parent company’s ability to exercise consolidated risk 
management on a global basis.  Additionally, while considerable progress has been 
made to strengthen supervisory crossborder cooperation and information sharing, the 
Federal Reserve and other U.S. supervisors have, at times, faced challenges in 
accessing information on a bank’s or BHC’s foreign operations or in carrying out 
examinations of cross-border or foreign activities.” (page 89) “The Federal Reserve 
aims to reduce systemic risk…Supervision carried out under this framework will 
support a variety of macroprudential supervisory approaches beyond those already 
discussed including…(f) Enhancing international coordination with foreign 
counterparts, including national supervisors and international bodies such as the Basel 
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Committee on Bank Supervision, the Financial Stability Board, and the Senior 
Supervisors Group. These activities focus on enhancing oversight of internationally 
active financial firms and markets and on minimizing the opportunities for firms to 
take advantage of weaker or inconsistent regulations.” (page 597) 
 
The next quote delineates the relevance of the majority-control threshold used in this 
paper. 
 
6. “section 3(a)(3) serves to prevent an existing bank holding company from increasing, 
without prior Board approval, its ownership in an existing subsidiary bank unless the 
BHC already owns 50 percent of the shares of the bank (section 3(a)(5)(B)). A bank 
holding company which owns more than 50 percent of a bank’s shares may buy and 
sell those shares freely without Board approval, provided the ownership remains 
above 50 percent. If a bank holding company owns less than 50 percent of a bank’s 
shares, prior Board approval is required before each additional acquisition of shares 
until the bank holding company’s ownership of the bank reaches more than 50 
percent.” (page 1382) 
 
The final quote provides the regulatory definition of “subsidiary” in the context of 
consolidated supervision. 
 
7. “A banking and finance subsidiary generally is defined as any company engaged in 
banking or finance in which the parent institution directly or indirectly holds more 
than 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock, or which is otherwise controlled or 
capable of being controlled by the parent organization.” (page 1509) 
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